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Ontic Injustice 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I identify a distinctive form of injustice – ‘ontic injustice – 
in which an individual is wronged by the very fact of being socially constructed as 
a member of a certain social kind. To be a member of a certain social kind is, at 
least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements, and these 
constraints and enablements can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to 
them, in the sense that they inflict a moral injury. The concept of ontic injustice is 
valuable in three main ways: it draws our attention to the role played by social 
kinds in enacting wrongful constraints and enablements; it clarifies our options for 
developing accounts of the ontology of particular social kinds, such as gender 
kinds; and – along with the related concept of ‘ontic oppression’ – it helps us to 
understand and respond to oppression.  
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1.Introduction1 
In recent years, a number of important contributions to moral, social, and political 
philosophy have identified distinctive forms of injustice that had not previously 
been explicitly defined. These have concerned phenomena such as knowledge – 
for example, Miranda Fricker’s (2007) account of ‘epistemic injustice’ – and 
                                                     
1 This paper began life as part of my (2016) PhD thesis of the same title, which benefitted 
enormously from the wise guidance of my supervisors, Jennifer Saul and Miranda Fricker, and the 
generous comments of Rae Langton, my external examiner. I have presented versions of this paper 
at seminars at the University of Cambridge, the University of Nottingham, the University of 
Edinburgh, and the University of Glasgow, and at conferences including Non-Ideal Social 
Ontology I (University of Stockholm), Defective Concepts (University of Leeds), and Social 
Ontology 2018 (Tufts University); I am grateful to the audiences at each of these events for 
stimulating discussions. I thank the following people for their detailed comments on the whole 
paper: Ásta, Johan Brännmark, Åsa Burman, Arto Laitinen, Kate Ritchie, and Aness Webster. 
Finally, I thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their extremely constructive comments, 
which materially improved the paper. 
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communication – for example, Rebecca Kukla’s (2014) account of ‘discursive 
injustice’. In this paper, I identify a distinctive form of injustice that concerns the 
social construction of human kinds. I show that an individual can be wronged by 
the very fact of being socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind – 
kinds such as wife, slave, woman, black person. Since this wrong operates through 
social ontology, I term it ‘ontic injustice’. I hope to show that ontic injustice is a 
distinctive, pervasive, and interesting type of injustice which merits attention from 
moral, social, and political theorists. 
I will begin by showing that there is an implicit consensus among different 
accounts of social ontology that what it is to be a member of a certain social kind 
is, at least in part, to be subject to certain social constraints and enablements. I will 
then offer a definition of ontic injustice, explain the nature of the wrong it involves, 
show how the concept can be applied to particular cases, and demonstrate what 
we stand to gain from incorporating ontic injustice into our conceptual repertoire.  
 
2. Constraints and Enablements in Accounts of Social Ontology 
Many prominent accounts of the ontology of social kinds explicitly hold that being 
a certain kind of social entity is, in some sense, a matter of being subject to certain 
social constraints and enablements. Probably the most well-known example of this 
is Searle’s account of institutional facts (1996; 2011). Searle focuses on those social 
facts which are the products of human institutions, such the facts that certain 
people are husbands, judges, and presidents. He holds that in order for it to be a 
social fact that some individual is a husband, a judge or a president, that individual 
must have certain ‘conventional deontic powers’. Conventional deontic powers are 
socially created permissions, duties, and so on that an individual has in 
dependence upon collective intentionality. If members of a society collectively 
recognise people who have been through a certain ceremony (a marriage, a 
swearing in) as having the powers associated with being a husband, a judge or a 
president, then this is what makes it the case that certain people are husbands, 
judges and presidents. 
Another view that explicitly focuses on constraints and enablements is Ásta’s 
(2018) account of social properties as conferred properties. Ásta’s view is 
somewhat different from Searle’s, since she is not only concerned with 
institutional kinds, but with more informal social kinds, which she terms 
‘communal’ kinds. According to Ásta, to be a particular sort of social entity is to 
have a certain status conferred upon you by relevant other social agents, where 
this status consists of particular constraints and enablements. For example, you 
might have the status ‘woman’ conferred on you in a cocktail bar, where this means 
that you can expect that men will buy you a drink if they wish to make conversation 
 
 
3 
 
with you, and that you are expected to dress in a certain way and to respond 
politely to overtures from strange men (unless you are already talking to a man). 
Having the status ‘woman’ conferred on you at a family party, or in a workplace, 
would involve different constraints and enablements. Moreover, when other 
agents confer the status on you, they typically take themselves to be tracking 
something about you. This ‘base property’ can also vary from context to context. 
In some social locations it may be genital status, in others, legal sex, and in others, 
self-identification as a woman. As should be apparent, on this view social kind 
properties are radically context-dependent. On Ásta’s view, the social property 
consists of a conferred social status, and the social status in turn consists of 
constraints and enablements. Thus, being a member of a certain social kind 
consists of being subject to the relevant constraints and enablements. 
There are other accounts of the ontology of social kinds that do not explicitly equate 
being a member of a social kind with being subject to social constraints and 
enablements. Nevertheless, many of these accounts implicitly allocate a similar 
role to constraints and enablements. For example, some accounts focus on 
equilibria in social behaviour (Calvert 1998; Greif and Kingston 2011). Finding 
oneself in a situation of social equilibrium, in which no-one can unilaterally deviate 
from a pattern of behaviour without making themselves worse off, necessarily 
means being constrained: the available options and outcomes have been altered 
by the social co-ordination, and some possibilities (deviating and benefitting from 
doing so) are ruled out.2  
Other accounts focus on causal patterns and predictive power. Here, too, we find 
constraints and enablements playing an important, though tacit, role. Consider 
Ron Mallon’s (2016) account of certain human social kinds, which equates these 
kinds with homeostatic property clusters, described by Mallon as ‘clusters of 
nonaccidentally co-occurring properties that sustain explanatory and practical 
projects including prediction, explanation, and intervention’ (2016: 69). These 
clusters are the result of co-ordinated behaviours prompted and organised by 
commonly understood conceptions of social roles. Races and genders are, Mallon 
argues, human social kinds of this sort: shared ideas about race and gender prompt 
people to behave in patterned ways, and this makes certain outcomes more or less 
likely for people who have been categorised a particular way with regard to race or 
gender. Here, too, constraints and enablements are implicitly in the picture, 
because in order for there to be patterns of outcomes that can support predictive 
power, it must be made harder or easier for people to do certain things. For 
example, if gender serves to predict earnings, then it must be the case that social 
                                                     
2 See Guala and Hindriks (2015) for an interesting model that unifies rules-focused accounts (such 
as Searle’s) and equilibria-focused accounts. 
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practices surrounding gender roles have made it harder (in some sense or other) 
for women than for men to earn high wages. 
I do not claim that all accounts of the ontology of social kinds entail that social 
constraints and enablements constitute (at least partly) membership in social 
kinds.3 Rather, I claim that there is an implicit consensus to this effect: most 
accounts of the ontology of social kinds either directly hold or indirectly imply that 
social constraints and enablements at least partly constitute social kind 
membership. In what follows, I will assume a view of the ontology of social kinds 
that accords with this consensus.   
 
3. Defining Ontic Injustice  
The phenomenon that I want to pick out with the label ‘ontic injustice’ concerns 
the constraints and enablements that constitute social kind membership. The 
thought is that in some cases, these constraints and enablements may be wrongful, 
in the sense that they are in contravention of the individual’s moral entitlements. 
As an example of this phenomenon, consider the situation of wives in England and 
Wales prior to 1991, which is when the marital rape exemption was ended in these 
countries. Prior to 1991, if a husband had sex with his wife without her agreement, 
including by force, this did not constitute rape in the eyes of the law, as it was 
deemed that in getting married the wife had consented in perpetuity to sex with 
her husband. Accordingly, an individual socially constructed as a wife lacked the 
social entitlement to refuse to have sex with her husband. According to many 
accounts of social ontology, including Searle’s and Ásta’s, what it was to be a wife 
in England and Wales prior to 1991 was, in part, to be someone who was not 
socially entitled to control fully sexual access to one’s own body. This state of affairs 
is clearly morally wrong: everyone is morally entitled to control fully sexual access 
to their own body. Accordingly, there is a profound mis-match between the moral 
entitlements of the individuals who were wives, and the social constraints and 
entitlements that constituted the social kind wife. It is this mis-match which I 
think is a distinctive type of moral wrong affecting those socially constructed as 
wives at that time, and which I aim to capture with the concept of ontic injustice.  
It is important to be clear from the beginning about what ontic injustice is not. 
Ontic injustice is not the harm that occurs when individuals actually act in 
accordance with the relevant constraints and enablements. For instance, in the 
example of wives in England and Wales prior to 1991, ontic injustice is distinct 
from the harm of a wife actually being raped by her husband. Furthermore, ontic 
                                                     
3 For an account that is consistent with the rejection of the claim that constraints and enablements 
constitute (at least partly) membership in social kinds, see Ritchie (2018). 
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injustice is not the same as the psychological damage that may arise from a 
person’s being aware of the wrongful constraints and enablements, which is part 
of what has been termed ‘psychological oppression’ (see, for example, Fanon 2008; 
Bartky 1979). Staying with the example of wives, we may imagine that a wife who 
was aware of the fact that she had no legal protection against being raped by her 
husband might well have found this thought distressing, and might also have 
suffered, for example, damage to her self-esteem. She may even have come to 
believe that she did not deserve to be able to fully control sexual access to her own 
body. Any of these psychological effects constitutes a serious harm, but none of 
these harms is what I am aiming to capture with the idea of ontic injustice. 
Rather, the wrong on which I am interested is the mere fact that an individual is a 
certain kind of social being, where what it means to be that kind of social being is 
to be subject to morally inappropriate constraints and enablements. In the 
example concerning the marital rape exemption, the ontic injustice is the mere fact 
that someone is a wife, where being a wife consists, at least in part, of being 
someone who is not entitled to control fully sexual access to one’s own body. A 
wife who is not raped by her husband and who suffers no psychological harm from 
knowing about the marital rape exemption still suffers ontic injustice.4 Ontic 
injustice, then, is a wrong at the level of being which affects every member of the 
social kind in question, regardless of their specific experiences. 
Here is a definition of ontic injustice: 
Ontic injustice: An individual suffers ontic injustice if and only if they 
are socially constructed as a member of a certain social kind where 
that construction consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to 
a set of social constraints and enablements that is wrongful to them. 
For instance, in England and Wales prior to 1991 the social kind wife was a site of 
ontic injustice because the marital rape exemption meant that being a member of 
the social kind wife consisted in part of lacking the social entitlement to control 
fully sexual access to one’s own body. This constraint was wrongful to those 
individuals who were socially constructed as wives because it removed their social 
entitlement to do something that they were morally entitled to do (namely, to 
control fully sexual access to their own body). 
Note that the definition specifies that the set of constraints and enablements must 
be wrongful to the individual in question. This is important, because social 
constraints and enablements are relational: my being under a certain social 
constraint, say, not to take your wallet from your pocket, means that you have a 
certain social enablement, in this case an enablement to retain your wallet in your 
                                                     
4 There is a parallel here with accounts of freedom as non-domination: a person is dominated if 
they are vulnerable to the arbitrary interference of another, even if that interference never takes 
place (Pettit 1996). 
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pocket.5 It follows that a person being subject to a wrongful constraint will mean 
that others are subject to corresponding enablements that are likewise wrongful. 
These corresponding enablements are wrongful, but they are not wrongful to the 
individual who has them, but rather to other individuals. For example, in England 
and Wales prior to 1991, a husband had the social enablement to have sex with 
his wife whenever he wanted regardless of whether she agreed to the sex. The 
husband’s set of constraints and enablements was therefore wrongful, but it was 
not wrongful to the husband, but rather to the wife. Therefore, the category of 
husband, although it involved a wrongful set of constraints and enablements, was 
not a site of ontic injustice.  
One question that might arise about the definition of ontic injustice that I have 
offered is this: why does the definition refer to constraints and enablements, when 
surely only constraints can prevent people from doing or receiving what they are 
morally entitled to do or receive?6 The answer is that I take it that sometimes 
enablements can indirectly prevent individuals from doing or receiving what they 
are morally entitled to do or to receive. One way this can happen is if the 
enablements create a pressure to act in a certain way, depriving the person of 
choices to which they were entitled. For example, consider a case in which 
mothers, but not fathers, are entitled to take time off from paid work to look after 
children. This might result in mothers feeling obliged to take time off from paid 
work, because there are no good alternatives, and in their being judged negatively 
if they do not take time off from paid work. As a consequence, mothers’ ability to 
choose how to arrange their lives is compromised and they may have reduced 
access to goods associated with paid work. Now, on some accounts of social 
ontology, this case would count as one in which mothers are under a constraint 
regarding their careers. If we confined our attention to those views, then we would 
be able to account for this case purely in terms of wrongful constraints. However, 
on other views, such as Searle’s, mothers would not count as being under a 
constraint, because there is no formal, collectively recognised duty for mothers to 
take time off from paid work – merely a prerogative to take time off (which is not 
shared by fathers). Therefore, the possibility of wrongful enablements must be 
kept open in order to make the definition of ontic injustice fit with any account of 
social ontology. Note, too, that the definition refers to a ‘wrongful set of constraints 
and enablements’. This allows for the possibility that a certain combination of 
constraints and enablements may prevent an individual from doing or receiving 
what they are morally entitled to do or to receive, even if no single constraint or 
enablement would have this effect by itself. 
 
                                                     
5 Brännmark (2018) offers a helpful account of this relationality in terms of Hohfeldian incidents. 
6 I thank Kate Ritchie for bringing this question to my attention. 
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4. The Wrong of Ontic Injustice  
The idea of a wrong that consists of being subject to morally inappropriate 
constraints and enablements serves to give an initial fix on the phenomenon that 
I want to identify as ontic injustice. However, the question then arises: what 
exactly does this wrong consist of? Being under a morally inappropriate set of 
constraints and enablements, such that other agents are socially licensed to treat 
one in morally impermissible ways, will typically raise the risk that such treatment, 
with the attendant material and psychological harms, will occur. For example, the 
existence of a marital rape exemption will usually mean that wives are at greater 
risk of being raped by their husbands, and also at greater risk of suffering 
psychological harms as a result of their awareness of this vulnerability. We tend to 
think that being placed at risk of harm can be wrongful in itself, as when someone 
is on the receiving end of irresponsible medical practice, but, due to sheer luck, 
does not sustain physical injury. So risk offers one way of understanding the wrong 
of ontic injustice. Yet I want to suggest that, as well as risk, being placed under a 
morally inappropriate set of constraints and enablements involves a further harm, 
one that Jean Hampton has termed ‘moral injury’, and which is understood 
roughly as an ‘affront to value or dignity’ (Hampton 1991: 1666).  
Hampton notes that the ways in which agents behave towards each other can 
convey meaning: by turning my back on you when you try to speak, for instance, 
I convey something about my attitude to you and to your attempt to speak in this 
context. Sometimes, the meaning of a certain behaviour enacts what Hampton 
terms ‘diminishment’, which is the appearance that a person’s value has been 
lowered. For example, violence inflicted on a person in a deliberately humiliating 
way not only harms the person materially and psychologically, but conveys the 
impression that the person lacks the kind of value that should properly be 
attributed to people. ‘Diminishment’, Hampton writes, ‘is an “objective” 
phenomenon, by which I merely mean… that it is not something that can be 
identified with any psychological experience of victimization. Instead, it is 
something that we “read off” the effects of immoral behaviour’ (1991: 1674) 
Moreover, Hampton stresses that diminishment is not an actual reduction in 
moral worth, but rather the appearance of a reduction in moral worth. The person 
who is subject to a deliberately humiliating violent attack does not actually come 
to have lower moral worth as a consequence; rather, the way they are treated gives 
the false impression that they have lower moral worth than they really do.  
Diminishment in turn, Hampton argues, causes damage to either the realization 
or the acknowledgement of a person’s value. Damage to the realization of value 
occurs when actual treatment takes place which is contrary to the entitlements 
someone has in virtue of her moral value. Damage to the acknowledgement of 
value occurs when someone is represented as having less moral value than she in 
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fact has; for example, an unsuccessful attempt to inflict humiliating violence on 
someone still conveys the impression that this form of treatment would have been 
appropriate, and hence that she has a lower moral value than she in fact has. If 
either form of damage to value occurs, the victim has suffered moral injury. Thus 
Hampton defines moral injury as ‘damage to the realization of a victim’s value, or 
damage to the acknowledgement of the victim’s value, accomplished through 
behaviour whose meaning is such that the victim is diminished in value’ (1991: 
1679, italics in original).  
In articulating the idea of moral injury, Hampton relies on the claim that most of 
us do in fact operate with some conception of the moral worth of human beings, 
which is to say, some ‘beliefs about how human beings are to be valued, and how 
to appraise each individual’s value’ (1991: 1666). For this reason, Hampton 
contends, we should care about the damage to the realization or acknowledgement 
of a person’s value that is caused by diminishment:  
I cannot explain that offensiveness [of damage to the realization or 
acknowledgement of value] by appealing to something else, because 
it is the foundation of our objection to wrongdoing; it is part of what 
it means to say that something is valuable that we ought to care about 
preserving and acknowledging that value. (1991: 1684) 
Thus, the concept of moral injury does not supply an account of the moral worth 
of human beings that we should be concerned to protect from damage – of what 
such worth is based on, why we should care about it, and so on. Rather, the concept 
of moral injury identifies a form of injury or wrong that anyone who already 
subscribes to an account of the moral worth of human beings should acknowledge, 
basing her judgements about putative cases of moral injury on her prior 
commitments concerning the moral worth of human beings.7 The concept of 
moral injury therefore relies on a modest metaethical commitment: one must not 
hold a conception of the value of different sorts of beings according to which an 
individual’s moral worth is entirely set by how they are socially represented, 
because such a conception would imply that it is impossible for an individual’s 
moral worth to be wrongly represented as lower than it in fact is. There needs to 
be some gap between actual moral worth and social representation of moral worth 
in order for the concept of moral injury to get off the ground.  
Importantly for our purposes, although moral injury is related to the risk of 
material or psychological harm, it is not identical with such risk. For example, 
noting that books advancing racist and sexist worldviews can cause moral injury, 
Hampton writes: ‘such books morally injure not one individual, but a whole class 
of individuals, leaving them sitting ducks for treatment lower (perhaps much 
lower) than that which they deserve’ (1991: 1679). However, moral injury is 
                                                     
7 I will return to this point in §5 below. 
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defined not merely as risk (being made into a ‘sitting duck’), but as actual damage. 
Moral injury brings with it a risk of damage to material and psychological 
wellbeing, but what it consists of is actual damage to the realization or 
acknowledgement of value.  
The concept of moral injury captures the wrong of ontic injustice. When someone 
is subject to constraints and enablements that license treatment that falls far short 
of the sort of treatment to which she is morally entitled, she suffers a moral injury, 
one that takes the form of damage to the acknowledgement of her value. This 
damage is an additional wrong over and above the wrong of being placed at risk of 
material and psychological harm. Someone who is socially constructed as a wife in 
the context of a marital rape exemption has been represented as having less moral 
value than she in fact has, suffering damage to the acknowledgement of her value 
that constitutes a moral injury. However, there are two ways in which I need to 
slightly adapt Hampton’s account of moral injury presentation in order to make it 
better fit my purposes.  
First, Hampton emphasizes ‘behaviour’ and seems mostly to be thinking about 
cases where an agent A behaves a certain way towards another agent, B, causing 
B to suffer diminishment. This makes sense within the context of Hampton’s 
larger project, which concerns theories of punishment.8 The problem here is that 
it does not make sense to think of an individual’s being socially constructed as a 
member of a certain kind as something that is enacted through the behaviour of 
one single other agent. Even in cases where a particular agent plays an important 
role – the officiant in a marriage ceremony, say – the maintenance of a social 
ontology requires the participation of many others as well, and this participation 
is often cashed out in terms of their attitudes rather than specific actions. However, 
there is nothing in the notion of moral injury itself that necessitates an 
interpersonal focus. The wrong that a person suffers when they suffer a moral 
injury is the actual damage to the realization or acknowledgement of their value. 
From the victim’s perspective, this damage can be the same, whether it is inflicted 
directly by one individual or via more diffuse mechanism. I will therefore think of 
moral injury as accomplished through treatment than through behaviour, where 
interpersonal behaviour is just one form of treatment. Someone who has been 
socially constructed as a member of a certain human kind has been on the 
receiving end of a form of treatment, even though this treatment cannot usually be 
equated with the behaviour of a specific individual. What matters is that the 
treatment is the product of human social arrangements, and therefore falls within 
the scope of considerations of justice, rather than being the product of natural 
                                                     
8 Specifically, she argues that it is because punishable behaviour enacts moral injury that retributive 
responses can be appropriate: retributive punishment can cancel out the diminishment by re-
affirming the victim’s moral worth. I take no stance on this application of the concept of moral 
injury. 
 
 
10 
 
forces. This last point is important. Categories which are not socially constructed 
cannot be sites of ontic injustice, because they are not the sort of thing that can be 
appropriately considered to be just or unjust. 
The second adaptation I need to make to Hampton’s account of moral injury 
concerns her focus on human beings. Again, this makes sense in the context of a 
discussion of punishment. But in fact, there is no general reason to limit the scope 
of moral injury to human beings. The concept of moral injury relies on a prior 
notion of a conception of the moral worth of human beings, and it is true that such 
conceptions loom particularly large in our moral landscape. However, it is 
perfectly possible to have a conception of the moral worth of beings of other sorts 
– ‘sentient beings’, for example – and many people do seem to hold such 
conceptions. Such conceptions can function as the basis of a judgement of moral 
injury just as well as conceptions of human value. I do not claim that everyone in 
fact holds conceptions of the moral worth of broader classes of beings beyond 
human beings, nor do I here wish to defend the claim that some such conceptions 
are warranted. I simply note that such conceptions will serve perfectly well as 
support for judgements about moral injury, and, for this reason, I will not take the 
notion of moral injury to apply solely to human beings, but treat it as applicable to 
any sort of being that may be the subject of a conception of value.9   
There is a close connection between Hampton’s account of moral injury and 
Stephen Darwall’s (1977) account of ‘recognition respect’.10 According to Darwall, 
there are two quite different attitudes that go by the name of ‘respect’. On the one 
hand, ‘appraisal respect’ is a positive evaluation of a person; this is the sort of 
respect involved in respecting someone as a sportsperson, or as a philosopher. 
Appraisal respect can be withdrawn, for example if one learns that one’s favourite 
sportsperson has been taking performance enhancing drugs, or that one’s 
favourite philosopher is a serial plagiarist. Recognition respect, on the other hand, 
is a matter of recognizing certain properties of someone or something, and being 
disposed to respond appropriately to these. This is the attitude involved in 
respecting someone as a person, or in respecting a work of art. We recognize that 
the person has certain morally relevant properties that mean that we ought not to 
harm her, exploit her and so on. Similarly, we recognize that the work of art has 
aesthetic value, and we ought not to wantonly destroy or damage it. Unlike 
appraisal respect, recognition respect cannot legitimately be withdrawn; even 
someone who has forfeited our appraisal respect as a sportsperson still has a claim 
to our recognition respect as a person.  
                                                     
9 This distinguishes my use of the concept of moral injury from, for example, Mari Mikkola’s (2016) 
use of it in her account of dehumanization.  
10 Another related concept is that of a ‘dignitary harm’ (Waldron 2014), and there are also links to 
Darwall’s work on dignity (2004). 
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Darwall further identifies a sub-category of recognition respect, moral recognition 
respect, in which the properties in question are morally relevant. The case of 
respecting the person is a case of moral recognition respect, whereas the case of 
respecting the painting is not. There is a strong relationship between failures of 
recognition respect and moral injuries. When a failure of moral recognition respect 
occurs, the individual towards whom the respect was owed suffers a moral injury, 
because damage has been done to the acknowledgement of their value. Moral 
injury is a more direct way of spelling out the wrong of ontic injustice, because it 
places the focus on what has happened to the individual who has been wronged, 
not on the attitude by means of which the wrong was enacted. However, the notion 
of recognition respect enriches our understanding of how moral injury is enacted, 
and, in particular, is useful in that it highlights the idea of a mis-match between 
moral entitlements, on the one hand, and social entitlements, on the other. When 
ontic injustice occurs, there has been a social failure to respond appropriately to 
the morally relevant properties of the individual in question, and it is this failure 
that enacts diminishment, the impression that the person’s moral value is less than 
it really is. In identifying cases of ontic injustice, then, we should be on the look out 
for instances of mis-match between moral and social entitlements, as highlighted 
by the idea of recognition respect.11 
Not everyone will be friendly to notions such as moral injury and recognition 
respect. For those who do not accept these notions, the wrong that I seek to pick 
out with the concept of ontic injustice must be understood more simply as the 
wrong of being placed at risk of material and psychological harms. If a particular 
wife never suffers marital rape and experiences no distress at knowing that she 
would have no legal recourse if she were to suffer marital rape, well and good; but 
she has still been placed at risk of these harms in virtue of being socially 
constructed as a wife, and that is wrong. For someone who rejects the concepts of 
moral injury and recognition respect, the wrong of ontic injustice will perhaps not 
seem as deep as it does to one who accepts those notions, but the pragmatic 
benefits of having the concept of ontic injustice are exactly the same.12 
The severity of an ontic injustice is the severity of the moral injury it involves, 
which in turn is determined by the strength of the diminishment, i.e. the strength 
of the impression that the individual’s value has been lowered. The question of 
                                                     
11 The notion of recognition respect has clear connections to more overtly political conceptions of 
recognition (Honneth 1996; Fraser 2014), and it seems to me that the account of the wrong of 
ontic injustice that I have offered here could easily be developed in that direction if one were so 
inclined. This would yield a version of the concept that was suited to use in a certain political 
framework. Whilst I have no objection to this, I am here seeking to offer a version of the concept 
that can be incorporated into as many different political and ethical frameworks as possible. I thank 
Arto Laitinen for encouraging me to expand on this point. 
12 I discuss these benefits in §6 below. 
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what determines the strength of diminishment is a complex issue, and one which, 
due to considerations of space, I cannot fully explore here. I suspect, though, that 
it is a function of at least three factors. The first factor is extent to which the social 
treatment falls short of that to which the individual is entitled. For example, an act 
of extreme and humiliating violence enacts a greater diminishment than a social 
slight or snub. The second is the importance of the relevant moral entitlements – 
how central they are to the conception of value (e.g. of human value) that is in 
question. Bodily integrity and autonomy are central to many conceptions of 
human value, so violations of these entitlements enact particularly strong 
diminishment. The third factor is the interpersonal context in which the 
diminishment takes place. For example, the meaning that is conveyed by someone 
being subjected to wrongful constraints and enablements is affected by who else is 
also subjected to those constraints and enablements.13 Imagine a society of total 
surveillance: everyone is constantly monitored, perhaps by some rotating system 
of mutual monitoring, and no-one is exempt. Let us further suppose that this 
monitoring is justified by reference to some conception of what it is to be a citizen; 
it is a citizen’s duty to submit to monitoring for the collective good. Qua citizen, 
one loses the social entitlement to maintain privacy; but since everyone is socially 
constructed as a citizen, everyone loses this entitlement. Now, assuming that 
people do have a moral entitlement to greater privacy than they receive here, there 
is indeed a moral injury in the picture here, one that is suffered by all citizens. 
However, the diminishment that is enacted for any given individual is much less 
severe than it would be if the monitoring only applied to a small group of 
individuals picked out by some characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual 
orientation. If that were the case, it seems to me that the impression of lowered 
value for those individuals would be much more pronounced, and the 
diminishment would accordingly be stronger. There may well be further factors 
relevant to the strength of diminishment beyond the three I have mentioned here, 
but a fuller exploration must wait for another occasion.  
 
5. Using the Concept of Ontic Injustice 
Hopefully, at this point it is clear to the reader what ontic injustice is. My task in 
the rest of the paper is to show that the concept of ontic injustice can earn its 
philosophical keep. In this section, I’ll give more detail about how the concept 
functions as a philosophical tool, and then, in the next section, I’ll say more about 
what we stand to gain from adding it to our conceptual repertoire. 
                                                     
13 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for encouraging me to explore this 
possibility.  
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In order for the concept of ontic injustice  to yield detailed judgements about actual 
cases, it needs to be combined with two further components: firstly, an account of 
the ontology of the social kind in question (which will draw on an account of the 
ontology of social kinds in general), and, secondly, an account of the moral value 
of the individual(s) in question and the moral demands to which this value gives 
rise. 
With regard to the first component, making judgments about ontic injustice 
requires us to know whether or not a certain constraint or enablement is partly 
constitutive of a social kind in question.14 This is a point on which people can and 
do disagree, based in part on the account of social ontology to which they 
subscribe. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of bisexual exclusion, whereby 
bisexual people are often, to varying extents, denied membership in queer 
communities and denied access to queer spaces and queer cultural resources. This 
is wrong: bisexual people have a genuine interest in having access to queer 
communities and cultural resources, and their exclusion is unjustified.15 Now, is 
this a case of ontic injustice? Well, that depends on whether there is a wrongful 
constraint that partly constitutes the social kind bisexual. According to Ásta’s 
conferralist account of social ontology, bisexual is here functioning as a communal 
kind, a social status conferred informally by other social agents in the queer 
community. When those agents behave towards people who they understand to 
be bisexual in ways that convey the impression that those people are unwelcome 
in queer spaces, then we can say that the social status of bisexual includes a 
constraint that makes it harder to be present in queer spaces. Therefore, a 
conferralist would say that the social kind bisexual is a site of ontic injustice. 
However, applying Searle’s account to this case would give the opposite result, 
because Searle holds that conventional deontic powers are the only type of 
constraint/enablement that contribute to constructing social kinds. Since 
conventional deontic powers depend on the collective recognition of entitlements, 
in order for the wrongful constraint generated by bisexual exclusion to partly 
constitute the social kind bisexual there would need to be an explicit recognition, 
that is at least widely shared, to the effect that bisexuals are not entitled to access 
queer communities and cultural resources. Since (I take it) bisexual exclusion 
typically does not work like this, because it is usually a much more subtle 
phenomenon, Searle’s account entails that the wrongful constraint generated by 
bisexual exclusion is not part of what constitutes the social kind bisexual, and so 
this is not a case of ontic injustice. This shows how judgements about putative 
cases of ontic injustice depend on one’s understanding of the ontology of the social 
kind in question. 
                                                     
14 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.  
15 For discussions of bisexual exclusion, see, for example, Eadie (1993), Serano (2013). Sceptics 
about bisexual exclusion are requested to grant its existence for the sake of the example. 
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With regard to the second component, what someone will think about putative 
cases of ontic injustice will depend on their views about what kinds of moral 
demands are created by different features of agents. For example, whether or not 
one thinks that the social kind non-human animals is a site of ontic injustice will 
depend on one’s views on the moral entitlements of different sorts of beings. If you 
hold a conception of the moral value of sentient beings according to which they 
ought to be killed simply for the expedience of others, then you will probably think 
that the social kind non-human animal involves a wrongful constraint, because 
non-human animals are sentient beings and it is socially sanctioned to kill them 
simply for the expedience of others. Recall that the explanation of the wrong of 
ontic injustice as a moral injury does not purport to supply a general account of 
moral demands, because applying the concept of moral injury always involves an 
appeal to some independent conception of the moral value of different sorts of 
beings and the demands this value generates. 
For reasons of space, I cannot in this paper address the question of how ontic 
injustice may best be combatted. However, it is important to recognise that the 
idea of ontic injustice does not entail that the best or only response to ontic injustice 
is to abolish the social kind in question. The best response could equally well be to 
change social ontology so that the kind is no longer constituted by wrongful 
constraints and enablements. Whether this is possible in a particular case depends 
on whether or not the wrongful constraints are a necessary part of the social kind. 
There is no general answer about whether this is possible; it depends on the kind 
in question.  
For example, the marital rape exemption in England and Wales was ended in 
1991: rape within marriage is now legally considered rape. Thus, the institutional 
kind wives has changed. Whether or not all wrongful legal constraints have been 
removed is another question, but it certainly seems plausible to think that all 
wrongful constraints could be removed without transforming the category so 
much that the label ‘wife’ is no longer appropriate. We may thus think that the 
social kind wife is only contingently a site of ontic injustice. In a similar spirit, 
Chike Jeffers holds a cultural theory of race according to which racial kinds could 
exist in the absence of racial oppression, since what is essential to racial kinds is 
not relations of dominance and subordination, but shared culture. On this view, ‘a 
situation in which racial groups persist but in a state of equality rather than 
socioeconomic and Eurocentric cultural hierarchy, respecting and mutually 
influencing each other while remaining relatively distinct, is a coherent and 
admirable goal’ (2013: 421). This kind of position, on which racial futures are 
possible and desirable, is perfectly compatible with the claim that races are 
currently sites of ontic injustice.16 By contrast, consider the social kind slave. 
                                                     
16 I thank Chike for helpful discussion on this point. 
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Although the constraints that constitute the kind slave are different in different 
institutions of slavery that have existed at different times and places, all of these 
institutions involve such a serious limitation of autonomy (besides frequently 
licensing the most extreme and brutal physical and mental harms) that it is 
impossible to imagine a social kind that merited the term slave that did not involve 
wrongful constraints. Even the least vicious form of slavery is very seriously 
wrongful. Therefore, it is natural to think that the social kind slave is necessarily a 
site of ontic injustice, and that the only appropriate response to this injustice is to 
abolish the kind completely. Thus, what one thinks about the response that ontic 
injustice merits will depend on the particular case of ontic injustice, and on one’s 
favoured account of social ontology and, in particular, of the ways in which social 
categories persist through time. 
 
6. The Theoretical Value of Ontic Injustice 
We do not need a concept of ontic injustice to see that some constraints and 
enablements can be wrongful; what, then, do we gain by having a concept of ontic 
injustice that draws our attention specifically to the role these constraints and 
enablements play in social ontology? In other words, we already knew that the 
marital rape exemption, for example, was an injustice; what do we gain by thinking 
of it as an ontic injustice in particular? There are three main reasons for 
incorporating the concept of ontic injustice into our conceptual repertoire. 
The first is that attending to the construction of social kinds highlights some 
specific ways in which wrongful constraints and enablements can function. This is 
because social kinds (as understood here) function to transmit constraints and 
enablements. If I am made into a wife, I come under the constraint of not being 
able to refuse sex with my husband. Nothing specific needs to be done to place me 
personally under that constraint in particular; indeed, I may not even know about 
it. Yet, in becoming a wife, I become subject to this constraint, because to be so 
constrained is part of what it is to be a wife. The operation of social ontology is thus 
a way by which many people come to be placed under constraints and 
enablements that are wrongful. Moreover, because many social kinds involve 
constraints and enablements that are valuable to people as well as ones that are 
wrongful, it can be the case that people cannot become members of social kinds 
that matter to them without placing themselves under wrongful constraints and 
enablements. This is because social kinds “bundle” constraints and enablements, 
so to speak. Staying with the marriage case, suppose that I want to become a 
certain person’s legal next of kin; under certain social conditions I can only do this 
by becoming a wife, and hence at the cost of placing myself under an obligation to 
have sex with my husband whenever he chooses. Although one or both of us might 
protest at this – John Stuart Mill’s (1851) statement preceding his marriage to 
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Harriet Taylor comes to mind17 – nothing can be done about it without changing 
the nature of the social kind wife, which is something that we, as two individuals, 
are not in position to do directly. Taking this thought even further, I might value 
membership in a social kind because of the meaning that kind has to me, 
independently of any particular constraints and enablements; perhaps I want to 
be a wife because of the religious significance this category holds for me. Yet I 
cannot access this good without placing myself under the wrongful constraint that 
partly constitutes the kind wife in my particular social setting. Thus, noticing how 
wrongful constraints and enablements can partly constitute membership in a 
social kind enriches our understanding of the sorts of difficulties they create for 
actual and potential members of the kind in question. 
The second benefit of the concept of ontic injustice is that acknowledging that 
being made into a member of a certain kind can be wrongful in and of itself can 
bring clarity and insight when it comes to debates about the nature of specific 
social kinds. For example, it is sometimes claimed that in order to do justice to the 
experiences of trans people, theorists of gender ought to adopt a constraint on 
descriptive accounts of the ontology of gender kinds to the effect that any 
acceptable account must entail that all trans people are members of their identified 
gender.18 In other words, it is sometimes claimed that if a descriptive account of 
the ontology of gender kinds does not entail that all trans women are members of 
the social kind women and that none are members of other gender kinds (and the 
same, mutatis mutandis, for other genders), it should be rejected.19 Call this ‘the 
descriptive constraint’. 
For someone who believes, as I do, that misgendering someone (treating them as 
a gender other than that with which they identify) is seriously morally wrong and 
plays a major role in oppression (Bettcher 2007; Kapusta 2016), the descriptive 
constraint has undeniable appeal. If the nature of gender kinds is such that 
                                                     
17 Mill writes: ‘[T]he whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law being such as 
both [Harriet Taylor] and I entirely and conscientiously disapprove, [because] it confers upon one 
of the parties to the contract, legal power and control over the person, property, and freedom of 
action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means of legally 
divesting myself of these odious powers (as I most assuredly would do if an engagement to that 
effect could be made legally binding on me), feel it my duty to put on record a formal protest against 
the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in 
any case or under any circumstances to use them.’ (1851: 159-60) 
18 Note that this claim is different from the claim that prescriptive accounts of gender terms ought 
to have this implication. The latter concerns how we ought to use terms like ‘woman’ within the 
context of an emancipatory political project. One proposal here is to use gender terms to refer to 
something other than gender social kinds in the sense usually understood in social ontology – for 
example, to gender identity (Jenkins 2015). 
19 This claim has been made by Stephanie Kapusta 
(https://blog.apaonline.org/2018/08/09/transfeminism-how-trans-issues-and-feminism-
overlap/) and by Rachel McKinnon (http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2016/01/ethics-
discussions-at-pea-soup-katharine-jenkins-amelioration-and-inclusion-gender-identity-and-the-
.html). I thank Stephanie for helpful discussion on this point. 
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everyone is a member of the gender with which they identify, then all instances of 
misgendering are straightforwardly factually inaccurate. This seems to offer a 
satisfying way of capturing the sense that something is going very wrong when 
misgendering occurs. However, offering an account of the ontology of gender 
kinds as they currently exist that meets the descriptive constraint rules out the 
possibility of applying most accounts of social ontology to gender. For example, a 
proponent of conferralism would have to say that because, in a transphobic 
society, gender is frequently conferred in ways that depart from self-identification, 
many people are often made into members of gender kinds with which they don’t 
identify. Other accounts fare similarly, because they take actual patterns of social 
behaviour to determine (in one way or another) the boundaries of social kinds, and 
current actual patterns of social behaviour frequently position trans people as 
members of the genders to which they were assigned at birth. Accepting the 
descriptive constraint therefore gives rise to serious theoretical challenges. 
Recognising the phenomenon of ontic injustice helps to open up a different 
avenue: instead of accepting the descriptive constraint, we should acknowledge the 
possibility that gender kinds at present are set up in ways that exclude some trans 
people from membership in the gender kind with which they identify (and include 
them in other gender kinds), and that this social construction is itself wrongful.20  
For example, in many contexts at present, genital status is treated as determining 
people’s gender for social purposes, meaning that some trans people are prevented 
from navigating gendered social spaces in a way that is congruent with their 
gender identity (Bettcher 2007). Let us take the fictional case of Alex, a trans 
woman, as an example for unpacking how we can see this situation as giving rise 
to ontic injustice. Because Alex lives in a transphobic society in which genitals are 
taken to be the decisive determiner of gender, and because of the way that her body 
appears, she is socially constructed as a member of the social kind men. This social 
construction is at least partly constituted by Alex being subject to a set of 
constraints and enablements that includes, for example, not being permitted to use 
women’s bathrooms (alongside many other wrongful constraints and 
enablements). However, I would argue, and proponents of the descriptive 
constraint would agree, that this social constraint is in violation of Alex’s moral 
entitlements.21 Thus, we can say that Alex is wronged by being subject to the 
constraints and enablements that constitute membership in the social kind men. 
She suffers an ontic injustice. 
Having the concept of ontic injustice to hand helps us to articulate the claim that 
it is a social fact that Alex is a man and not a woman – but it ought not to be. Alex 
is wronged by being socially constructed as a man, because the constraints and 
                                                     
20 Dembroff (forthcoming) adopts a similar stance on cases such as this.  
21 This is a substantive claim about moral entitlements, and what I say here is not intended to settle 
disputes about this claim. 
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enablements that partly constitute kind membership are at odds with her moral 
entitlements. By bringing this wrong into focus, the concept of ontic injustice 
allows us to say that an account of the ontology of gender kinds according to which 
Alex is a member of the social  kind men (and is not a member of the social kind 
women) may be, not an incorrect or wrong account of ontology, but rather a 
correct account of a wrongful ontology. This does justice to our sense that there is 
something profoundly wrong going on when Alex is categorised as a man whilst 
avoiding taking on the theoretical difficulties to which the descriptive constraint 
gives rise. 22 Having the concept of ontic injustice to hand thus helps us identify an 
alternative to the descriptive constraint that is worthy of investigation. 
The third reason that ontic injustice is a valuable philosophical tool is that it aids 
our understanding of various kinds of systematic oppression, such as gender-
based oppression and race-based oppression. Although specific definitions vary, 
oppression is generally understood to be a systematic, significant, and pervasive 
phenomenon (Frye 1983; Young 2011; Cudd 2006). In some cases of ontic 
injustice, the set of constraints and enablements that (partly) constitute kind 
membership impose limitations that are sufficiently systematic, significant and 
pervasive to qualify as oppressive. I will use the term ‘ontic oppression’ to describe 
this type of ontic injustice.23 Ontic oppression should be understood as a 
subspecies of ontic injustice: not every case of ontic injustice is an instance of ontic 
oppression, for some cases of ontic injustice will feature only trivial limitations in 
a very narrow domain, which cannot be said to amount to oppression. In a similar 
vein, ontic oppression is not synonymous with oppression as such, because it may 
well be the case that some of the limitations or disadvantages that feature in a 
certain instance of oppression are not constitutive of the oppressed kind. Rather, I 
understand ontic oppression as capturing one facet or aspect of oppression.  
There is a close connection between the concept of ontic oppression and a family 
of accounts of race and of gender/sex according to which race and/or gender/sex 
is the product of oppressive social relations. Monique Wittig, for example, writes: 
It is oppression that creates sex and not the contrary…. The category 
of sex does not exist a priori, before all society. And as a category of 
dominance it cannot be a product of natural dominance but of the 
social dominance of women by men, for there is but social dominance. 
(1996, 26–27) 
Similarly to Wittig, Catharine MacKinnon (1991) holds that gender is constituted 
by relations of sexualised domination and subordination. Charles Mills’ work on 
the ‘racial contract’ (1999) expounds a roughly parallel view about race categories, 
                                                     
22 Of course, recognising ontic injustice does not prevent us from endorsing accounts of the 
ontology of gender kinds on which all trans people are members of their identified genders; it 
merely enables us to entertain accounts that do not have this consequence.  
23  See also Dembroff (forthcoming) for exploration of a similar idea. 
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according to which race categories are the product of an agreement between 
European people to treat non-European people as ‘subhuman’ (having an inferior 
set of rights), thereby producing the category of ‘White’ and various categories of 
non-white people. Sally Haslanger (2012a) defends accounts of both race and 
gender according to which these kinds are defined by systematic subordination. 
Each of these views posits that ontological categories such as ‘woman’ and/or 
‘Black person’ are constituted by oppressive constraints. The concept of ontic 
oppression brings into sharper focus the claim that this social construction is 
wrongful in and of itself.   
One reason that this sharpening of focus is useful is that recognizing ontic 
oppression has the potential to affect how we approach emancipatory projects. The 
claim that social kinds are wrongful in and of themselves can function as the basis 
for a demand for intervention to change the nature of these kinds. If people 
constructed as women, for example, are wronged by being so constructed, then 
justice demands that the process of social construction be disrupted. The exact 
form that this disruption would need to take depends, of course, on the specific 
account of the ontology of social kinds that one favours; as Haslanger puts it, we 
need to understand social ontology in order to identify the ‘levers for change’ 
(2012b, 215). However, it is certainly possible that the necessary disruption may 
turn out to involve intervening in social processes which are not themselves 
obviously wrongful aside from their role in maintaining the construction of a kind 
which is a site of ontic oppression. The concept of ontic oppression, and of ontic 
injustice more broadly, can help us to make a strong case for this sort of 
intervention by getting a clear fix on the wrong that we are seeking to prevent – 
ontic oppression – and laying bare its relation to the specific social processes that 
we are targeting in our efforts to bring about emancipatory social change. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that the very fact that an individual is a member of a social kind can 
be wrongful, because the constraints and enablements that partly constitute kind 
membership can be wrongful to the individual who is subjected to them. I have 
termed this wrong ‘ontic injustice’, and equated it with a moral injury, or damage 
to the acknowledgement of an individual’s moral value. I have shown how the 
concept of ontic injustice must be combined with specific accounts of both social 
ontology and moral value in order to yield judgements about particular cases. 
Finally, I have argued that the concept of ontic injustice is valuable in three main 
ways: it draws our attention to the role played by social kinds in enacting wrongful 
constraints and enablements; it clarifies our options for developing accounts of the 
ontology of particular social kinds, such as gender kinds; and – along with the 
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related concept of ontic oppression – it helps us to understand and respond to 
oppression.  
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